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Entrapment, Economics, and Geopolitics: 
The Obstacles and Conditions for Turkish 
EU Membership
Spencer Pearce
Introduction
Turkey first joined NATO in 1952. It was a founding member of the Council of 
Europe in 1949 and of the United Nations in 1945. Turkey was also recently elected as a 
non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In fact, Turkey has been 
a member of these major international institutions longer than many current EU members. 
The Czech Republic, along with Poland and Hungary, joined NATO in 1999. Why are 
nations which have such a short history of international involvement members of the Euro-
pean Union while Turkey, which has been actively engaged in major international institu-
tions for over 50 years, remains outside?  
Turkey’s candidate status with the European Union is the result of a long process of 
political and social reform. It became an associate member of the EEC (precursor to the EU) 
in 1963, and progress since then has been slow. Numerous theories attempt to explain the 
necessary conditions for accession to the EU, as well as the obstacles that candidate countries 
such as Turkey face. Even though these theories have important distinctions, explanations 
relating to economic and geopolitical forces seem to provide a common canvas for the de-
scription of this ongoing process. This study will assert that economic pressure actually plays 
a minor role in Turkey’s EU candidacy and that geopolitical reasons offer the best explana-
tion both for Turkey’s candidacy and hopefully its eventual accession to the EU.
Economics
Andrew Moravcsik argues that economic concerns consistently outweighed geopoliti-
cal or strategic concerns for France, Germany, and the Benelux nations during the formative 
years of the European Economic Community (Moravcsik, 1998).  In other words, Moravc-
sik believes that Germany and France created the European Coal and Steel Community for 
a single economic reason: they each had half of what both needed for vital economic ac-
tivities. These economic forces were sufficient to induce cooperation among these nations. 
Consequently, an initial economic agreement was reached that all parties could accept, and 
this began the gradual integrative process that has created the EU. The reason this gradual 
The Obstacles and Conditions for Turkish EU Membership
integration occurred (as per Moravcsik) is that each nation had common or compatible 
country preferences, state bargaining apparatus, and institutional choices. Although there 
is not space here to expound all of Moravcsik’s theory, it is sufficient to state that he as-
serts that the European Community developed along economic lines, not geopolitical or 
strategic ones.  
If Moravcsik’s analysis is a good representation of the reason for the creation and 
enlargement of the EU, then Turkey faces serious challenges in its bid for EU Member-
ship.  Turkey already has reasonably close economic ties to the European Union due to the 
1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement. Turkey has a strong and mutually beneficial 
import-export relationship with several EU members, the foremost being the UK and Ger-
many. The major problem for Turkey is that most of the benefits that EU members would 
enjoy if Turkey were to enter the EU are already realized vis-à-vis these mutual free trade 
agreements. The potential economic benefits of Turkish membership are therefore invisible 
to EU members, because they already enjoy most of them. Therefore, the pressing econom-
ic considerations that brought European nations together in the fifties are radically different 
from the economic realities that are currently influencing Turkey’s membership bid. Even 
though Turkey is a candidate country, because the free trade agreement with Europe effec-
tively mutes many of the benefits of further integration, the driving force behind Turkey’s 
candidacy must be explained by something besides economic trade concerns. 
Vachudova and Moravcsik use insights from basic bargaining theory in order to create 
another economic framework to explain EU enlargement. Their description of this model, 
which builds on the work of Nye and Keohane, illustrates how in a bargaining situation the 
nation which will benefit the most from the bargain will have to make the largest conces-
sion. Conversely the nation which has the least to gain from the agreement will have to 
give up the least because they have less anxiety about forgoing the more modest gains of 
cooperation (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003).
The authors use this bargaining framework to explain the positions of the Netherlands 
and France in the initial 1950s bargaining over the Treaty of Rome. The Netherlands, 
which had the most to gain from a customs union and was the least willing to forego ratifi-
cation, actually had to make the most concessions of any European country. France on the 
other hand, as a larger and more self-sufficient economy, was much more capable of going 
at it alone (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003). Whereas the lack of a customs union would be 
a severe blow to the Netherlands, for France it would be only a minor setback. This meant 
that theoretically France should be able to wring large concessions out of the Dutch while 
giving up relatively little of its own goals (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003), which is more 
or less what happened in 1957.
This theory would also suggest an equilibrium where both bargainers receive about 
equal benefits from the transaction. The Dutch had to make large concessions in order to 
secure French support for the customs union so their overall end utility was actually much 
lower than they had hoped. France on the other hand received only minimal utility from 
the bargain to begin with, which only increased moderately as it received the desired con-
cessions. Thus, French benefits increase from a low point, while Dutch benefits fall from a 
high point to meet somewhere roughly in the middle. Economic theory might suggest an 
exact equality, since France could theoretically keep pressuring the Dutch for concessions 
until the  marginal benefit of the treaty for France is exactly equal to the Dutch’s expected 
utility. In practice however, other geopolitical goals or perceived obligations may cause 
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France to stop asking for concessions somewhere before their level of utility vis-à-vis the 
Dutch hits the break-even point.
If bargaining theory is a good explanation for EU enlargement, then this is good news 
for Turkey since it has a strong bargaining position relatively similar in quality if not size 
to France in the example cited above. Turkey has the second largest population of any EU 
nation after Germany and is expected to pass Germany by 2020. Turkey also has a very 
diverse economy that has weathered the recent economic crisis extremely well. This can 
be seen by the fact that Turkey is one of the few European nations posting a positive GDP 
growth rate through these recent years of general economic downturn. In fact, Turkey has 
an average GDP growth rate of 3.75% per year, which is one of the highest growth rates 
in Europe (World Bank, 2010). Therefore, from a bargaining position, Turkey today looks 
somewhat similar to France in the 1950s. Both have a rebounding economy (France from 
WWII, Turkey from the recent worldwide recession) and a large workforce with high an-
ticipated future growth.
As noted above, a free trade agreement with the EU passed in 1995 already allows 
Turkey to trade with EU members in machinery, semi-finished and other goods. This 
means that the most likely economic benefit to Turkey in the event of EU accession is 
probably not free trade in goods or commodities (which as discussed above is somewhat 
invisible due to the 1995 free trade agreement). Rather, increased growth would likely 
come after Turkey’s EU accession boosts investor confidence which would cause a large 
inflow of investment capital. While these gains would be substantial and generate significant 
growth, it seems doubtful that they would serve as a sufficient condition to bring Turkey 
into the European Union. This logic is supported by the bargaining concept of perceived 
gains. As per the bargaining theory above, the nation with the most to gain must make the 
largest concession at the negotiating table. If the biggest economic gains in the EU-Turkey 
dyad really do come from increased direct investment, it is important to discuss whom this 
investment benefits most. Conventional thinking would suggest that Turkey would be the 
primary beneficiary of capital inflows, but this may not be the case. 
Although foreign investment capital would generate new growth in Turkey, the im-
pact of this inflow would be tempered by the fact that the past 20 years have seen a remark-
able boom in domestic investment capital due to the creation of Islamic investment banks 
in Turkey. Islamic banks, which according to Islamic law are forbidden to charge interest, 
allow more religiously devout Turks an opportunity to invest their savings in the market. 
Additionally, these Islamic banks also grant Turkish businesses access to large amounts of 
Saudi and Kuwaiti investment capital (Fuller, 2008), something that was not possible earlier 
due to the reluctance of the some devout Saudis and Kuwaitis to invest in western style 
banks (which charge interest). In fact, the first Islamic banks in Turkey which opened in 
1985 were joint Arab-Turkish projects (Fuller 45). These banks were huge successes and 
in the period 1985-1999 over 120 Islamic bank branches were opened throughout Turkey 
(Fuller, 2008). These Islamic banks are important because in generating large amounts of 
domestic capital they lessen the relative importance of foreign investment from Europe. 
Also, since most investors in Islamic banks are Turks, when funds are withdrawn for private 
spending that consumption goes directly to the Turkish economy. In the case of European 
investment capital, any money that is removed is likely to be spent somewhere in Western 
Europe.
The point of this example is that although European investment capital would be 
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welcome and important in the event of Turkish EU accession, due to the recent boom in 
Turkey’s domestic capital markets the benefit of future European investments is probably 
not as high as European elites assume it is. In other words, Turkey does not need EU capital 
as much as European investors assume, which means that Turkey’s economic bargaining 
position is actually stronger than it appears to the rest of Europe. This situation, where both 
Turkey and the EU believe they have a strong economic bargaining position creates a dead-
lock because each side assumes that it has the stronger position, and therefore waits for the 
other party to make bigger concessions. This deadlock is further reinforced by the fact that 
external economic conditions reinforce the assumptions of both Turkey and the EU. Turks 
see that they have a reasonable supply of domestic investment capital so they feel no hurry 
to make huge concessions to EU members (i.e. concessions to Greece on border disputes 
in order to remove Greece’s veto on several chapters of the accession criteria). Conversely, 
European investors have not run out of profitable investment projects outside of Turkey, 
so they feel no great need to make bargaining concessions. Thus, the perceptions and bar-
gaining positions of both sides reinforce each party’s behavior and perpetuate a deadlock. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that an economic framework based on a bargaining model will be 
capable of explaining how and when Turkey will achieve full EU membership. 
Of any European economy currently outside the EU, Turkey probably needs the 
European Union the least because it has such substantial trade relationships with non-EU 
nations such as Russia, China, and Iran. As mentioned above, EU members probably do not 
appreciate this fact. Conversely, it also appears that the EU is very capable of carrying on 
fine with Turkey outside of the EU as medium level trade partner. In other words, bargain-
ing as formulated by Nye and Keohane does not predict the likely entrance of Turkey into 
the EU anytime soon. But, as Turkey has been given candidate status and is moving forward 
with the necessary reforms to achieve full membership, there are clearly other attractive 
forces at work. Nye and Keohane’s theory is clearly able to explain some, if not most, of the 
economic reasons behind other countries’ accession, but as noted above their theory simply 
reaffirms that Turkey’s candidacy is not progressing due to economic reasons. We therefore 
see, after considering the economic models espoused by Morovcsik and Vachudova, that 
economic theories relating to trade, both in physical goods and investment capital, are un-
likely to explain the conditions under which Turkey would be admitted into the EU. We 
must therefore look for non-economic explanations for Turkey’s current EU candidacy.
Entrapment
Frank Schimmelfennig (2008) proposes another theory which attempts to explain the 
motivating power behind Turkey’s candidate status. Schimmelfennig points out that from 
its inception the European Council decided on a rule-based process for enlargement. The 
author argues that “human rights, and liberal democracy…are the fundamental rules of le-
gitimate statehood in the EU” and that, “fulfilling these requirements is the necessary and 
sufficient conditionality to entrap the EU” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Because 
of this collective decision for rule or criterion-based admission, the founding charter of Eu-
rope (Maastricht; Article 49) states that “‘Any European state which respects the principles 
set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union’” (Schimmelfennig, 
2008). Thus, the members of the European Union may become rhetorically entrapped (i.e. 
their treaties may legally compel them to act in a manner that goes against their own imme-
diate domestic political preferences). This makes sense because the cost of a single conces-
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sion (i.e. Turkish candidacy) will almost certainly be smaller than the net gains of belonging 
to the EU. Therefore, because continued membership in the EU requires strict adherence 
to these treaties, existing member states may be compelled to accept Turkey as a candidate 
(after it fulfills the treaty requirements) even though it goes against the political preferences 
of some members’ governments.
Because the EU is a rule-based organization, fulfillment of the legal treaty conditions 
for EU candidacy (as per the Copenhagen and Maastricht requirements) are also the precise 
conditions for successful rhetorical entrapment. These conditions are:
• The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy
• The rule of law 
• Respect for human rights
• Respect for and protection of minorities
• The existence of a functioning market economy
• Must be a “European country” (still not officially defined)
Thus, any nation which meets all the above criteria must be considered for EU candi-
dacy as per the Maastricht and Copenhagen requirements. These requirements will there-
fore form a rhetorical trap or constraint for any member opposing such a candidacy.
One example of the theory of entrapment is the candidacy of Greece to enter the 
Eurozone (EMU). When the EMU requirements were first formulated, Germany (the chief 
mover behind the monetary union) did not envision a monetary system that would extend 
to less financially stable areas of the EU, such as Greece. Germany accordingly recommend-
ed what it felt was a very high bar for EMU admittance. Eventually, to Germany’s great 
surprise, Greece (admittedly with some sleight of hand) made the budgetary and monetary 
policy changes necessary to join the Eurozone (R. Bronk, personal communication, March 
3, 2010).
These EMU criteria, though different from the Copenhagen requirements for EU 
candidacy are nevertheless a reflection of the rule-based modus operandi employed by the 
EU. If a nation meets an organization’s requirements, it must be admitted. This is just one 
aspect of the devotion to the rule of law which is the backbone of EU policy.  Even though 
Germany did not expect that Greece would ever actually be able to meet the EMU require-
ments, the rules laid down for Eurozone membership ‘entrapped’ Germany and forced it 
to accept Greek EMU membership once the requirements had been met. This account 
provides good evidence that EU member states can be rhetorically entrapped to abide by 
the rule-based criterion they have set for full admission to their organizations. However, 
whether or not further integration will proceed with respect to Turkish EU candidacy 
depends on whether Turkey, like Greece, is willing to implement the domestic changes 
necessary to join the club (in this case the EU, not the EMU).
Even though Turkey has shown itself willing to adopt measures sufficient to be con-
sidered for EU membership, this does not necessarily mean that it will have the domestic 
political will to implement all changes requisite for full membership. In his book with 
Ulrich Sedelmeier, Schimmelfennig explains that different policies have different domestic 
costs for each nation, and that the cost of implementation may be greater than the current 
government is willing to bear (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The authors point 
out that this is especially true for governments whose domestic political control is based on 
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authoritarian measures or repressive political maneuvers. Thus, it remains unclear whether 
the current Turkish government is willing or able to bear the political costs of implement-
ing the entire EU acquis communitaire in order to progress from candidate country to full EU 
member. Turkey faces several issues that may prove stumbling blocks on its road to EU 
membership. These include civilian control of the military, Kurdish complaints of ethnic 
discrimination, the Armenian genocide, questions of economic stability and corruption, 
Greek territorial disputes, and the unresolved division of Cyprus. The remainder of this pa-
per will discuss the relative difficulty of implementing reforms on these issues and how they 
are likely to affect Turkey’s ability to rhetorically entrap EU member states.
Geopolitics
Turkey has had numerous historical issues over civilian control of its military.This is a 
particularly central concern for the EU, since free and fair democratic elections are a found-
ing principle of the union. The Turkish military, which views itself as the guardian of secu-
lar Kemalist principles, seized control of the government in 1960 and 1980 (Howard, 2001) 
in order to prevent the Turkish government from devolving into the hands of what it views 
as undesirable political parties. To the Europeans this is a gross violation of the principles of 
Western democracy, but as Ozay Mehmet points out, many Turkish nationals feel differ-
ently about the matter. Mehmet argues that many Westerners do not understand the unique 
role that the military plays in Turkey as the guardians of the secular state (Ismael & Aydin, 
2003) and defenders of Kemalism (the secular ideology of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of 
modern Turkey). It should be noted that the military coups, for all of their problems, did 
eventually return control of the government to civilian hands. Howard points out that Gen-
eral Kenan, leader of the 1980 coup, seized control of the state to stop the escalation of civil 
violence (5,241 deaths in two months due to civil unrest, bombings, etc) (Howard, 2001). 
In 1983 Kenan returned power to the civilly elected government after a new constitution 
was ratified by referendum and elections were held. Admittedly, the military has played a 
strong role in the new government, but Turkey is still a far cry from military dictatorships 
such as Burma (Howard, 2001).  
In reference to the legitimacy of Turkey’s current government, it should be pointed 
out that in counterpoint to other military regimes the military coups in Turkey have domes-
tically been viewed as attempts to restore civil order and secularism to the nation (Howard, 
2001). Long term military rule was never the goal, and has not been the result. Military 
involvement in the government via the National Security Council has been significant for 
several decades, though it has declined in recent years. Regardless, the government has 
always eventually returned to civilian control. The fact that democratic ideals have con-
sistently resurfaced after repeated military coups shows that secularism and democracy are 
not transitory aspects of Turkey’s political structure, but are integrated elements of a secular 
political culture. With respect to entrapment, this shows that Turkey is dedicated to democ-
racy, and as such is fulfilling this requirement of the Copenhagen criteria and is therefore a 
qualified EU candidate.
Although EU leaders and citizens are alarmed to see an unelected group exercising 
considerable political power, Turkey is not the only European country to have such prob-
lems. Italy, a founding member of the EU, faces questions about the free and fair nature of 
its democratic elections because the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, owns most of 
the television broadcasting media in Italy. This gives him a significant advantage in national 
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elections and constitutes a major source of political power that is not derived from a demo-
cratic source. Although owning TV stations in Italy is clearly different from holding an un-
elected post as a general in Turkey, there are similarities in that a person in either position 
has a substantial amount of power that is not derived from a democratic process. If Italy can 
be considered a stable democracy despite the threat to free and fair elections posed by Mr. 
Berlusconi’s media monopolies, then Turkey should be afforded similar leeway with respect 
to the level of democracy in its elections, despite its history of military involvement in the 
government. Incidentally, the last successful military coup in Turkey was in 1980, at which 
time Poland, East Germany, and many other current EU members were still communist na-
tions under the influence of the Soviet Union. If 30 years is enough time for these Eastern 
European nations to leave behind communism, fully embrace democracy, and join the EU 
surely it is enough time for a 58-year member of NATO to do the same.
This brings up another current challenge. In February of this year fourteen army of-
ficers were detained for involvement in a plot to overthrow the government. This plot, 
named Sledgehammer, came as an eventual result of the pro-army AK Party (Justice and 
Development Party) gaining considerable ground in Turkey’s 2003 elections. Had it been 
successful, this plot could have led to a military coup such as the one that occurred in 1980. 
Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who reported the story for the online news source Today’s Zayman, 
says that this represents a milestone in Turkish history. He is in turn quoting Ahmet Altan 
of the Taraf newspaper, who expressed that these arrests represent the beginning of the end 
of an epoch of military independence from civilian control (Cengiz, 2010).  
Despite the initial shadow this incident casts over Turkey’s candidacy it may actually 
be a sign that Turkey is developing a stronger commitment to democratic government. It 
must be reiterated that this was an unsuccessful military coup and that it was not the first of 
its kind in European history. For instance, at the time of Algerian succession there was a mil-
itary plot by top-ranking French generals to take over the government of France.This plot 
was discovered and dealt with, just as the February plot in Turkey. The fact that the civilian 
government of Turkey is actually able to expose, arrest, and prosecute top-ranking military 
officials is actually a signal that Turkey is moving in the right direction, not the other way 
around. It should however be noted that these arrests were carried out with the knowledge 
and consent of the military high command, which was not in on the plot. As embarrassing 
as this failed coup may be it shows important progress in Turkey’s century-long struggle 
for civilian control of the military. In the 1960 and 1980 coups, the military won without a 
contest. In 2010, the civilian government suppressed the coup without incident and put the 
military officers responsible behind bars. Call it what you will, that is progress. The purpose 
of comparing Turkey to Berlusconi’s Italian government or the failed Algerian generals’ 
coup in France is that Europe’s history of stable democratic institutions is a very checkered 
past, even for some of the founding members of the EU.  
The implications for entrapment are that Turkey’s government and military units are 
now, perhaps more than ever before, under the civilian control of a freely and fairly elected 
democratic government. This incident demonstrates that Turkey is in fact fulfilling the 
Copenhagen requirement for “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy”. Also, in terms 
of difficulty of implementation, it appears that the civilian government is not only likely, 
but eager to implement further democratic reforms, as this will strengthen their domestic 
power. The issue of civilian control of the military, which is very important both to the 
EU and to Turkey, is not likely to prove a major stumbling block to Turkey’s candidacy.
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Another major issue for Turkey with respect to EU accession is the problem of human 
rights. The two most important categories in this debate are the treatment of the Kurd-
ish minority and the WWI genocide of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish 
question, which from Ankara’s perspective is a terrorism issue, looks to the Europeans more 
as a problem over minority rights (and therefore human rights). Turkey’s government in 
particular has been criticized for the poor economic status of Kurds generally throughout 
the country. One Turkish perspective, as set forward by Ozay Mehmet (Ismael & Aydin, 
2003) is that development, employment, and prosperity in Kurdish areas are lower because 
the incessant terrorism in these predominantly Kurdish areas has stunted the development 
of the infrastructure and economy in that region. Although the hard stance taken by Ankara 
is initially uninspiring, it appears that granting greater cultural rights to Kurds is a politi-
cally inexpensive policy for the government now that Öcalan (head of the PKK –Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) is in prison and his deputy, Karayilan, has declared a temporary cease-fire 
to seek a diplomatic end to the conflict (Yackley, 2010). There have already been steps 
taken to implement public education in the Kurdish language, and some broadcast media 
is now also available in Kurdish. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) has also begun 
investing heavily in the infrastructure of southeast Turkey where most Turkish Kurds live. 
Therefore, although the Kurdish issue may appear initially intractable, there are signs that 
the situation of this minority population in Turkey has improved recently and that they will 
continue to do so, at least as long as EU membership remains a possibility. If Kurdish treat-
ment continues to improve, this human rights issue will cease to be an obstacle to Turkish 
accession and will be yet another tool of rhetorical entrapment in favor of Turkish accession.
The second important human rights issue is the still unresolved and unrecognized (by 
Turkey) issue of the Armenian holocaust. To some extent many among the Turkish politi-
cal elite are in a collective denial over the Armenian genocide. They admit that atrocities 
were committed on all sides during WWI, but consider the Armenian deaths more a conse-
quence of combat during war than a plan systematically designed to exterminate the Otto-
man Empire’s Armenian population. Most of the world recognizes this event - in which the 
Ottoman Empire killed over a million Armenians - as genocide and as a point of historical 
fact. In contrast, the mere mention of the word ‘genocide’ fills Turkish leaders with anger. 
The topic is not open for negotiation. In March 2010, just days after the U.S. and Sweden 
passed motions recognizing the Armenian genocide, Turkey recalled its ambassadors to both 
countries. This issue is obviously very sensitive for domestic political leaders, indicating that 
it must have a very heavy political cost. Clearly, the political fallout of recognizing the Ar-
menian genocide would weaken the government that passed such a motion.  
On the other hand, Turkey has recently begun working to normalize its relations with 
Armenia. Both the Armenian and Turkish leadership have stated that recognition of the 
genocide is not a precondition for talks. Therefore, although this is a sensitive issue, non-
recognition of the Armenian genocide should not be enough to keep Turkey out of the 
EU, since it was not committed by Turkey, and Turkey is not legally responsible. From the 
standpoint of entrapment this is a moot point as even immediate recognition of the geno-
cide would not entrap EU members since, as noted above, there is no legal requirement 
for Turkey to make restitution. Therefore, this is really only a particularly tender cultural 
hot-spot, but not a necessarily huge political roadblock for Turkey.
The next important geopolitical concern facing Turkey is whether it has a ‘functioing 
market economy.’ The overall economic performance is excellent as evidenced by its aver-
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age GDP growth rate of 3.75% (World Bank, 2010). However, in addition to economic 
growth, one important element of a truly free and functioning economy is the guarantee to 
investors that the government will respect private property rights and, in the case of nation-
alization, properly compensate private owners for any government-induced property loss. 
One recent incident shows that Turkey is finally entering a stage where private property 
rights are accorded this degree of legal protection. The Uzan family, which owns 66% of the 
Cyprus-based Lubananco energy company, sued the Turkish government for $21.5 billion 
for business losses which they incurred when the Turkish government expropriated their 
family’s companies. The government claimed that the Uzan brothers were siphoning off 
company profits, but they claim that the move was purely a political move by the govern-
ment (Daily Zaman, 2010). The matter has finally come before an international tribunal in 
Paris, where the brothers have come forward to testify in the court. Regardless of which 
party is found guilty, the fact that both parties have access to due process of law to assert 
their ownership rights is clear evidence that Turkey is committed to the protection of pri-
vate property rights.
In regards to its EU candidacy, Turkey’s efforts to create a more transparent legal ap-
paratus for investors is clearly having a positive effect. As a result of recent reforms, inves-
tors have a better idea of the risks they face, and are more willing to invest in the Turkish 
economy. This relatively strong investor confidence is reflected in Turkey’s average GDP 
growth rate (3.75%). In reference to entrapment, both the Uzan case and the high GPD 
growth are evidence that Turkey has a functioning market economy - it recently jumped 
from 26th to 17th in world GDP rankings - and is ready to join the EU. Furthermore, this 
economic growth is not the result of large oil resources, as is the case with nations such as 
Russia or Saudi Arabia. Compared to its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey is extremely 
poor in natural gas and petroleum. Instead, the growth in the Turkish economy reflects an 
increasingly diversified mix of services and goods which can be provided by an ever more 
skilled and better educated population. Turkey’s steadily improving economic performance 
shows that it meets this Copenhagen requirement, and as such must be considered for EU 
membership.  
Relations between Greece and Turkey are and will continue to be a crucial issue in 
Turkey’s accession negotiations. Although Greco-Turkish enmity dates back to Greece’s 
war of independence from the Ottomans, recent history indicates that mutual cooperation 
is now possible. Onis points out that despite longstanding Greek animosity, Greece actually 
voted in favor of Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 (Onis, 2000). This 
spirit of cooperation came after two earthquakes hit Turkey and then Greece in the summer 
and early fall of 1999. Both countries responded to the other with bottom-up civil rescue 
efforts (Onis, 2000). The aid efforts after the earthquakes seemed to have brought about 
a mutual recognition that both countries shared common dependencies and that working 
together was both possible and desirable, which in turn led to Greek support in 1999 of 
Turkey’s candidacy bid.
There are a host of territorial disputes and disagreements between Greece and Turkey, 
not the least of which is a hotly-contested claim by Greece to extend its territorial waters up 
to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean. However, there is neither space nor reason to enumer-
ate all of them here. This is true because most, if not all, of these disputes existed prior to 
1999 when Greece voted in favor of Turkish candidacy, thus signaling that all of these issues 
were - at least to the then-current government - negotiable and should not stand in the way 
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of Turkish candidacy.
One issue that has changed since 1999 is accession of Cyprus to the EU. Since then, 
Greece has blocked the opening of several accession chapters for Turkey, citing Turkey’s 
failure to open its sea and air ports to Cypriot vessels. We can therefore logically conclude 
that this issue is a sufficient condition for Greece to continue blocking Turkey. Also, be-
cause Greece was willing to support Turkish candidacy prior to Cypriot succession, we can 
also therefore conclude that if the situation with Cyprus were resolved, the other outstand-
ing Greco-Turkish disputes would once again be negotiable with respect to Turkey’s can-
didacy. The rest of this paper will therefore focus on Turkey’s relationship with Cyprus as 
this represents “the single overriding constraint on Turkey’s progress to full membership…” 
(Carkoglu & Rubin, 2003).   
With regards to entrapment, this means that Turkey must recognize Cyprus in order 
to be admitted to the EU, since recognition of fellow member states can be construed as a 
de facto Copenhagen requirement as per the points on the rule of law and respect for basic 
human rights. Logically, Turkey’s non-recognition of Cyprus constitutes a de facto denial of 
basic legal and human rights to the Greek Cypriots on the part of the Turkish government, 
an issue which must be resolved if Turkey’s candidacy is to move forward. Conversely, if 
Turkey normalizes relations with Cyprus, EU member states will not have just legal cause 
for halting accession negotiations and will be ‘rhetorically entrapped’ into moving towards 
Turkish membership.
The relationship between the Turkish minority and the Greek majority in Cyprus is 
at the heart of this conflict. The island has had a tumultuous history, due to the fact that at 
various times in the past century both Turk and Greek Cypriots have sought unification of 
the entire island with their ethnic kindred in either Greece or Turkey. This has led to un-
derstandable hostility from the other ethnic group. The two communities have experienced 
numerous failures since the Turkish invasion of 1974, but the most important aspect of the 
relationship can be summed up with two anecdotes.
In 1965 the UN Secretary General U Thant said in reference to the Turkish Cypri-
ots (though it might be applied to both sides, since each has rejected peace settlements), “ 
[L]eaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having 
members of the two communities live and work together” (Council of Europe, 1999). This 
summarizes the intractable and hostile attitudes that have historically divided the island, as 
each group has voted down (in referendum or through elected officials) the attempted ne-
gotiations proposed by the other side.
This leads to the second anecdote. On Monday, March 22 the Greek Orthodox Arch-
bishop of Cyprus crossed through the Ledra Street crossing point into Northern (Turkish) 
Cyprus. This was the first visit of a Cypriot archbishop to Northern Cyprus since the Turk-
ish invasion. He first went to a monastery that has been abandoned since the 1974 partition 
of the island, where a conservation project is actually being planned. The Turkish news me-
dia reports that Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey sent a letter to the Archbishop to express 
his personal approval of the restoration project for this historic site (Today’s Zaman, 2010).
The point is this: It seems that finally both parties are willing to slowly begin talking 
and living as inhabitants of the same island. Obviously, all tension will not melt in a day 
or a year. But as the two sides begin to interact and normalize relations, the same sort of 
process can occur between Turkish and Greek Cypriots that occurred between France and 
Germany after WWII. The creation of the ECSC proved that over time social and eco-
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nomic interactions can lead to dialogue that normalizes once-hostile relations and creates a 
proactive partnership. As Abraham Lincoln put it, “Do I not destroy my enemies when I 
make them my friends?”
If Turkey is able to cooperate with other EU members in the reunification of Cyprus, 
it will indeed have made friends of its former adversaries. This is possible if Ankara contin-
ues to project a moderate and conciliatory tone towards Cyprus. Such a stance would force 
Turkish Cypriots to soften their stance towards Greek Cypriots, who have little political or 
military power to back up their historically hostile separatist attitudes. The Greek Cypriots 
would also have incentives to soften their stance towards both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
proper as this could lead to eventual reparations for the Greek Cypriot property seized in 
the 1974 invasion and (hopefully) reunification of the entire island. The immediate goal for 
Turkey should therefore be the peaceful and equitable reunification of Cyprus, with the 
key requirement that Turkish be guaranteed as one of the official languages of whatever 
bi-partisan government emerges. This would be extremely beneficial for Turkey, as having 
Turkish recognized as an official language in an EU member state would mean that all of-
ficial EU documents would have to be made available in Turkish. Even if Turkey remains 
outside the EU for years to come, having all official EU publications in Turkish would 
increase the coherency and transparency of the EU for the Turkish public and help build a 
more pro-European domestic movement. In the context of entrapment, Cyprus represents 
both the greatest threat and greatest potential asset to Turkey’s candidacy. If Turkey can 
help realize a reunified Cyprus, this could create the impetus for the removal of Greek and 
Cypriot vetoes on several Turkish accession chapters.  Cypriot reunification would also re-
move the greatest rhetorical and legal justification that allows other EU members sufficient 
leeway to oppose Turkish membership. The EU as a body would therefore be rhetorically 
constrained to continue the integration process with Turkey by opening and implementing 
further chapters in Turkey’s succession negotiations.
Conclusion
This study has used Schimmelfennig’s framework to argue that rhetorical entrapment 
is likely Turkey’s only chance for admission to the EU, since as discussed above there are no 
strong economic forces that will draw it in. Also, because Turkey is predominately Muslim 
and speaks a non-European language it is unlikely that other cultural and religious factors 
will improve the Turkish membership bid. This study also asserts that there are no absolutely 
irreconcilable obstacles in Turkey’s path. The EU must follow its own legal requirements 
for admitting new member states. Therefore, fulfillment of the treaty requirements set by 
the EU for membership represent both a necessary and sufficient condition for the rhetorical 
entrapment of EU states to accept a new member. However, whether or not the EU will 
accept Turkey as a full member (and whether or not entrapment as a coercive force is able to 
actually to constrain EU states to accept a new member) is primarily dependent on Turkey’s 
ability to implement further domestic reforms.  
It seems clear that the economic and social benefits of EU membership far outweigh 
the domestic political costs of resolving the geopolitical obstacles facing Turkey. This is 
particularly true in a current political climate where Kurdish militants are willing to negoti-
ate, the Turkish Cypriots are willing to admit a Greek Archbishop, and domestic Turkish 
political reforms seem to be finally taking root in Turkish society. The major obstacle then 
to Turkey’s membership in the EU may not be a single geopolitical issue, but its ability 
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to grow in such a short time. The EU is itself working to digest the addition of 10 new 
member states. This is not so different from a Turkish population that is striving in one 
generation to adapt to a host of new liberal western governance principles. How fast and 
how completely these changes can be incorporated into Turkey will likely be the greatest 
determinant of the trajectory of Turkey’s EU candidacy.
In a very unstable area of the world Turkey offers the European Union and the en-
tire Western world the most secular and moderate partnership of any Muslim country in 
the world. Welcoming Turkey with open arms would introduce something that Europe 
has been lacking: a moderate stable voice that will resonate with European Muslim im-
migrants and encourage them to emotionally and politically buy into the European system 
of governance. Of course granting Turkey full EU membership does not mean that all the 
Muslims in Germany and France will move out of ghettos, or become politically and cul-
turally integrated into European society. But, it does mean that these minorities will have 
the example of an entire nation which has the ability to be both Muslim and European. If 
the current EU member states genuinely want to integrate their Muslims immigrants into 
European society, they should seriously consider the benefits of admitting Turkey, the only 
Western-looking secular Muslim country in the world, into the European Union. The rate 
at which the Turkish government has passed sweeping economic political reforms in recent 
years indicates that it is serious about EU membership. 
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